In 1987 when I shifted from South (Andhra Pradesh) to Faridabad (Haryana), for the first time we had felt the heat of summer when there was undeclared power cut ranging from 4 to 8 hours a day. That time I did hear stories about power position in Delhi, and yes, once in a while when we stayed with our relatives at Delhi we found the difference as the frequency of power cuts or failure of power supply was almost unheard of.
In 1992 I had a choice to stay either in Delhi or Faridabad -- the choice was obviously Delhi. But this time, for the first year the power position was satisfactory, but soon the undeclared power cuts and power failures started surfacing. I had no clue about the power supply, the power sector and problems related to demand and supply of power.
During this period I had informal interaction with some cable manufacturers who were supplying cable to the then Desu (Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking). To my horror, most of them were making money by supplying sub-standard cables to Desu i.e. less number of strands in the cable or thickness of the strands was thinner than the prescribed thickness or recycled plastic was used for insulating the cable. This evoked my interest in the power sector and the reasons for frequent cable faults and cable bursting came to my knowledge. But that was just a beginning.
It seems at that point of time, somewhere in 1991, a group of chief ministers met to discuss the power sector and undertook to initiate reforms in the sector. This was precisely the time in 1992 when T&D (transmission & distribution) losses in Delhi shot up from 20 per cent to 50 per cent in 1998. The most interesting aspect of the episode is that the person responsible for abnormal increase in T&D losses became the champion of reforms when the Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission was constituted in 1999.

Genesis of reforms
By this time I too had realised that the power sector in Delhi was in shambles. The reliability of power supply was at its lowest ebb. The rampant corruption ensured that the interests of powers-that-be or the connected individuals are protected and the general public is taken for a ride.
The political vote bank was protected by ensuring virtually free power supply directly from the cable without any meter. It was a free-for-all situation. No complaint was ever heard or addressed. The steel/furnace and other industry in Delhi especially in non-conforming areas virtually enjoyed unlimited power supply with limited payment in connivance with Desu and DVB (Delhi Vidyut Board). The JJ clusters too enjoyed freedom of using water heaters or other heaters for cooking, TVs, coolers and other gadgets free of cost at the cost of the state exchequer, as the honest tax payer and the consumer was footing the bill.
The only saving grace was that if one could muster up courage to reduce his/her complaint in writing and follow up the same by taking down the telephone number of the senior most official of Desu or thereafter DVB and bother them at odd hours, some action was taken. But how many could actually exercise this option - only a very few. DVB was the victim of vote bank politics, inefficient work culture and greedy bureaucracy.
Since the situation was beyond redemption, accounts were not available and the assets in hand could not be verified in absence of asset register, the government in its wisdom had no option but to resort to 'power reforms.'
The thrust of power reforms was to invite bids from private power distribution companies and hand over the distribution to them with certain incentives like assured return on capital employed, sharing of revenue generated out of T&D losses contained with consumers and of course contain the blatant fraudulent abstraction of power by the political vote bank.
Thus the idea was to stop annual drainage of nearly Rs 1,200 crore out of the state exchequer—the honest tax payer's money that was pumped in to keep the ailing DVB afloat.
As the first step towards tariff adjustment exercise, DERC issued concept paper in September 2000 with a view to seek public participation in the tariff setting process, introduce transparency and public participation in the vital exercise. The first order on the concept paper was passed on January 16, 2001 whereby various contentious issues other than tariff setting were settled.
Thereafter the Commission passed the first order on May 21, 2001, whereby after analysing the ARR submitted by DVB, the tariff was increased by about 22.5 per cent in case of domestic consumers and overall tariff increase was about 15.75 per cent. DERC rejected multi-year tariff determination principles for 2002-03 to 2005-06.
Subsequently, in February 2002, DVB was unbundled and AT&C losses were determined for various DISCOMS (distribution companies). The government of NCT of Delhi, in order to encourage, granted a loan of Rs 3,450 crore. DERC issued order for tariff determination for 2002-03, 2003-04, 2004-05, 2005-06 and 2006-07. DERC, in order to avoid 'tariff shock' to consumers, introduced the innovative concept of 'regulatory asset.' Once the system of 'regulatory asset' was put in place there was pressure on distribution companies to perform.
The T&D losses continue to be in the range from 39 per cent to 90 per cent in 19 districts of the Capital. In fact distribution companies recently claimed that they have installed transformers whereby they can have complete data of power supplied and power billed in each area.
Therefore, going by the logic offered by the companies, there should not be any problem in detecting theft-prone areas and nabbing culprits. But the facts are otherwise.
This year Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission had invited suggestions from the public on adoption of multi-year tariff and also on multi-year tariff revenue requirements. I had opposed the basic concept of introduction of MYT (Multi Year Tariff) on grounds that the companies are still not geared up to face multi-year tariff.
Further, till date there is no addition in the generation capacity in the city. The power is purchased from neighboring states.
The annual requirement was 3,500 mw a few years ago, has now gone up to 4,500 mw. The reasons are multifold increase in multiplexes, shopping malls and DMRC project.
No doubt, Delhi's power reforms have been a shocking failure, but where does one look for solution?